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Among economists the work of John Sutton1 on industrial organisation has greatly 
altered the way they look at concentration and market structure. In his works he 
stresses  the  importance  of  exogenous  and  endogenous  sunk  costs2  to  explain  the 
evolution  of  market  structure  in  various  industrial  sectors.  His  theory  has  its 
foundations in the context of game theoretic literature which models increasingly 
dominated the field of industrial organisation. Among economic historians though 
this theory has not yet gotten its deserved attention. Apart from a notable exception3, 
most  economic  historians  have  stuck  with  older  models  such  as  Bain’s  structure-
conduct-performance paradigm4 in their attempts to explain industrial concentration in 
the course of history. Sutton’s model can be somewhat complicated if one is not 
accustomed  to  this  economic  literature  and  involves  quite  some  explaining  of 
economic methodology. Nevertheless better understanding of business history can 
probably  be  achieved  by  applying  or  testing  Sutton’s endogenous  cost  model  on 
economic history. Aside from some robust implications of the model, the eventual 
outcome  depends  delicately  on  historical  and  institutional  factors  giving  way  to 
historical analysis. Since the evolution of technology has an important place in the 
theory, research on the history of technology can be very useful for the model.  
 
Some  subsets  of  industries,  referred  to  as  high-alpha  industries,  are  especially 
qualified to be studied using Sutton’s theory. These are industries were incurring 
high  endogenous  sunk  costs,  mostly  through  advertising  or  R&D  spending,  is 
possible. Most sectors of the food industry, being an advertising intensive industry 
where  perceived  quality  matters  a  lot,  qualify  par  excellence  to  apply  Sutton’s 
concept.  
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This  goes  as  well  for  the  beer  sector.  The  brewing  industry  was  one  of  the  first 
industrial sectors in Belgium where advertising and branding played an important 
part.  The  food  industry  in  general  and  the  brewing  industry  in  particular  have 
experienced  enormous  phases  of  concentration  during  the  twentieth  century,  in 
Belgium and most of the other developed countries.  
In his standard work on sunk costs5, Sutton examines the food industry in the United 
States.  He  attributes,  according  to  the  theory,  the  observed  concentration  in  the 
American brewing industry to a large extent on the escalation of endogenous sunk 
costs. To some degree developments in the Belgian brewing sector were similar to 
the  American  experience.  But  the  industry  operated  under  different  conditions 
which affected the eventual outcome. 
 
The history of food industry is largely overlooked terrain the Belgian historiography, 
despite being one of Belgium’s largest industrial sectors. Maybe this was caused by 
the fact that the industry consisted mainly out of smaller enterprises in contrast to 
the large-scale iron and coal industry in Belgium6. Besides, there is a lack of available 
archives for most of these smaller companies7. Only a few articles address the food 
industry specifically8. Within the food industry though, the brewery sector, being 
one of its biggest segments, belongs among the more studied sectors. Because of its 
cultural impact and the status of beer as an important Belgian specialty some books 
or articles were publicised giving a broad overview of the beer industry and the 
Belgian  beers,  meant  for  a  larger  audience9.  There  are  also  some  more  focussed 
publications about the Belgian brewing industry10. The work of Jansen11 (1987) gives 
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a  profound exposition on  the brewing industry  in  Belgium  and  The Netherlands 
during the twentieth century and compares both in a broad perspective. Jansen also 
pays some attention to the issue of market structure and concentration. Brouwer12 
(1981) wrote an article concerning the observed concentration in the brewing sector 
throughout a number of countries, and included the Belgian case. There is also quite 
some  international  literature  available  on  the  brewing  industry  and  its  market 
structure  in  various  countries13.  The  contributions  handling  concentration  in  the 
Belgian brewing industry are relatively scarce and focus mainly on economies of 
scale in production of beer although some also mention transport costs or possible 
effects of advertising. 
 
To examine industrial dynamics and concentration of the Belgian brewing industry 
during the interwar years, we start with a theoretical section, explaining Sutton’s 
theory on industrial concentration. We then look briefly at the developments in the 
Belgian beer market up until WWI. The brewing industry remained mostly artisanal 
and fragmented. The market was dominated by top-fermenting beers. To understand 
the structural revolution entailed by the breakthrough of bottom-fermentation beers, 
we then return to the origins of this new technology. The technological shift was 
characterised by the transition to an industrial brewing process. This produced a 
beer that was immediately well-liked by the consumer. The breakthrough in Belgium 
of  those  beers  and  the  developments  brought  forth  by  it  are  studied  in  the  next 
section.  The  main  effect  of  the  introduction  of  this  new  technology  was  a 
considerable rise  in  fixed  costs.  This  could  already  have been  a  first  impetus for 
concentration. Then we apply the ideas of Sutton on the Belgian beer industry and 
the concentration that took place in the industry during the interwar years. Finally 
we see how historical and institutional events complicated the theory and have an 
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2. SUTTON’S THEORY ON MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
Sutton’s  theory  is  an  attempt  to  explain  industrial  concentration.  Industrial 
concentration  was  a  feature  that  puzzled  economists  because  of  the  empirical 
observation  of  coexistence  of  high  concentration  and  high  profitability14.  This  was 
apparently contradicting some of the basic economic laws. The arbitrage principle15 
stated that opportunities must be filled. So if a market was dominated by only a few 
companies  making  high  profits, there  are  incentives for entry  by new companies 
challenging the incumbents. When markets kept growing, economies of scale could 
not provide a sufficient explanation for this observation, since there is more room for 
other large-scale competitors, and therefore concentration should diminish and tend 
to zero. 
 
For a long time, economic literature of industrial concentration was dominated by 
the “structure-conduct-performance” paradigm of Bain, giving an explanation for this 
paradox.  Typical  of  this  model  is  the  one  way  causal  relationship  between  the 
different components. Structure determines conduct which in its turn accounts for 
performance. In this model it was the given structure of the market that influenced 
business behaviour which explained the differences in market performance.  
Structure,  as  the  leading  determinant  of  the  model,  was  given  because  of  the 
existence of exogenous barriers to entry such as the technology or economies of scale. 
Thus  in  the  model  of  Bain concentrated  market  structure  can be  sustained  when 
barriers impede the entry of profit seeking entrants. This way this theory emphasizes 
the  efficiency  arguments  for  concentration,  while  Sutton  will  look  at  strategic 
arguments as cause of concentration16. 
 
Sutton’s main criticism, originated in the genesis of game-theoretic literature, on this 
paradigm was that some of these ‘exogenous entry barriers’ are actually ‘endogenous’ 
costs.  Companies  make  choices  on  the  amount  of  R&D  and  advertising,  thus 
deciding on the real or perceived quality of their products, without being bound by 
some externally imposed threshold. These costs are both fixed and sunk meaning that 
they  won’t  fluctuate  with  the  level  of  output  and  cannot  be  recovered  to  any 
significant degree. 
So, in his theory, Sutton assumes free entry, which is not constrained by a certain 
height of exogenously given entry barriers. According to Sutton the question is what 
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configuration  of  market  shares  and  spending  on  those  endogenous  costs  is  both 
viable  and  stable.  The  situation  applying  to  these  conditions  forms  a  Nash 
equilibrium17 and can be maintained because once this stadium is reached, it allows 
no  profitable  deviation.  To  model  the  strategic  interaction  two  easy-to-grasp 
conditions must hold.  
Naturally  firms  will  not  adopt  loss-making  strategies.  So  this  means  that  the 
companies’ profits should cover their costs. This is a rational condition because firms 
will not be able to remain in business in the long run if they make losses.  Since this 
basically implies that firms must be able to survive, this condition is referred to as 
the viability condition. 
The other condition has been mentioned already as the arbitrage principle, stating 
that existing profitable opportunities will be filled18. This restriction only needs one 
smart agent to hold. Only one firm needs to discover the ‘hole in the market’ to fill 
the opportunity. Because of these opportunities, no stability in the market can be 
obtained if this condition does not hold. Therefore this condition is called the stability 
condition. 
 
For Sutton’s model both the stability and the viability conditions must be satisfied. 
Consider a market in which firms are willing to engage in some kind of a quality race 
trying to improve some attributes of a product by adopting new technology or by 
advertising. For this market structure to be steady we need a configuration that is 
both  viable  and  stable.  Structure  will  then  depend  upon  the  extent  to  which  a 
fragmented industry can be destabilised by a high-spending deviant19. How much 
market  share  can  a  firm  take  from  its  competitors  by  raising  the  quality  of  its 
products? This ‘quality’ is broadly defined. Generally it encompasses any feature 
that  raises  consumers’  willingness-to-pay  for  the  product  in  comparison  to  rival 
products20. Sutton calls the parameter capturing this alpha, whose value depends on, 
amongst others, the pattern of technology and consumer preferences.  
If the value of alpha is positive, this implies that a firm offering a higher-quality 
product  can  attain  a  profit  exceeding  his  given  share  of  industry  revenue. 
Accordingly this alpha is called an escalation parameter because it determines whether 
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a company can raise its share by ‘escalating’ its effort in improving the quality of its 
products. 
This alpha sets a lower bound on the level of concentration. This means that if it’s 
possible to enhance consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a product to some extent by a 
proportionate increase in fixed costs, then the industry will not become fragmented, 
however large the market becomes21.  
 
The degree to which this ‘competitive escalation’ strategy yields results, is influenced 
by two other factors. The first is the effectiveness of the deployed strategies in raising 
the real or perceived quality of the products and thus the consumers’ willingness-to-
pay  for  the  firm’s  products.  The  cost  of  advertising  for  example,  is  negatively 
correlated with the value of alpha. If the effectiveness of advertising increases, the 
value of alpha will rise. 
The second is linked to the homogeneity of the market. A more homogeneous market 
will make it easier for a firm to capture market share from its rivals and spread the 
costs of the quality escalation among a bigger amount of products. Growing market 
integration and product substitutability will tend to raise the value of alpha. 
 
Thus, the peculiarities of the market, but also broader economic developments will 
determine whether an industry qualifies as a high-alpha industry. If this is the case 
there  will  no  longer  be  a  monotonic  relationship  between  market  size  and 
concentration, though there will always be some minimal level of concentration22. If 
concentration lies below some lower bound, the configuration will be broken by the 
actions  of  a  deviant,  leading  the  industry  towards  an  equilibrium  level  of 
concentration. Therefore this theory is also called the bounds approach. The prediction 
of the theory will lie between certain bounds. The forecast of the eventual level of 
concentration will not be precise, but will be within a certain range. This way the 
model  holds  over  a  large  set  of  industries23.  The  observed  equilibrium  level  of 
concentration will depend delicately on the historical details of the market24. First-
mover-advantages or the initial level of setup costs, for example, will have a serious 
impact on the eventual outcome. Important for the brewing industry will be that 
according to Sutton sometimes a rise in exogenous sunk costs, such as setup costs 
will  be  necessary  for  the  process  to  take  off.  This  rise  alone  leads  to  some 
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concentration. It is possible that only a discrete jump to a higher level of advertising 
yields  results.  Only  when  firms  are  big  enough  and  when  concentration  is  high 
enough firms will be able to make this jump. 
Sometimes  this  escalation  process  can  be  muted  or  stopped  due  to  institutional 
factors or different reactions to historical events, leading to an other than expected 
outcome.  The model does not mention anything about the dynamics of the process 
leading  towards  an  equilibrium  structure,  only  the  end  result  can  be  specified. 
Whether the concentration process evolves through merger, internal growth or the 
disappearance  of  non-performing  firms  can  only  be  detected  through  historical 
research and depends mostly upon historical factors.  
 
This theory provides a valuable starting point for economic history research. In his 
work  Sutton  pays  a  lot  of  attention  to  the  industry  history  giving  important 
supplementary evidence for the theory25. After all, it remains difficult for economists 
to  test  equilibrium  theories,  because  of  their  specific  nature.  The  mechanism 
maintaining the equilibrium is the same that would come into play if the industry 
structure diverged from the equilibrium configuration. Here economic history comes 
to their aid. The mechanism can only be observed when coincidentally the historical 
industry  structure  is  not,  or  not  anymore,  an  equilibrium.  This  is  more  likely  to 
happen in the early days of an industry when the situation had not yet stabilized, or 
when  an  external  shock  due  to  technology  or  demand  hits  the  system26. 
Notwithstanding this, Sutton’s approach doesn’t seem to have gotten the attention it 
deserved by economic historians. Little research has been conducted by historians 
making use of Sutton’s ‘endogenous sunk costs model’. One notable exception stands 
out.  G.  Bakker  (2005)  wrote  a  paper  providing  a  convincing  explanation  for  the 
observed concentration in the film industry using Sutton’s model27. 
 
The  brewing  industry  was  usually  reckoned  among  the  advertising  intensive 
industries  where  consumers  were  very  responsive  to  branding.  Furthermore,  the 
brewing sector has experienced a strong concentration, evolving rapidly from what 
was mainly an artisanal craft to an industrial sector. In the Belgian case especially the 




                                                 
25 SUTTON, J., Technology and Market Structure, Cambridge, 1998, p. 17. 
26 SUTTON, J., Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of 
Concentration, Cambridge, 1991, p. 309. 
27 BAKKER, G., ‘The decline and fall of the European film industry: sunk costs, market size, and 
market structure, 1890-1927’ Economic History Review, 58-2 (2005), p. 310-351.   8 
3. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BELGIAN BEER MARKET UNTIL WWI 
 
Consumption  per  capita  of  beer  was  traditionally  very  high  in  Belgium,  both  in 
absolute and in relative terms. This was due to, amongst others, comparatively low 
excise taxes and a lack of alternatives. Beer was seen by the Belgian authorities as a 
necessity  instead  of  a  luxury28.  On  some  of  the  beers  of lower  density  that  were 
frequently drunk during meals, even no excise tax was levied at all29. In contrast to 
most other western countries beer was not only well-liked among the lower classes 
but was also drunk by the upper-class30. Imported beverages such as tea were not as 
popular in Belgium as in countries with a long colonial tradition. There was virtually 
no  wine  production  and  import  made  this  product  expensive.  There  was  some 
consumption  of  liquor,  but  certainly  not  as  important  as  in  some  of  the  more 
northern countries31. A law from the beginning of the twentieth century prohibited 
the sale of liquor in pubs32. 
 
Consumption  of beer rose  during  the last  decades  of  the nineteenth century  and 
reached a peak around the beginning of the twentieth century. During the record 
year  1913,  the  average  Belgian  citizen  drank  223  litres  of  beer33.  Subsequently 
consumption declined gradually but remained still high in absolute terms. Moreover, 
population  growth  compensated  part  of  the  consumption  decline  during  the 
interwar years. 
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Amsterdam, 1961, p.36. 
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 (Graph 1: Source: CBB34) 
 
Before  World  War  I  the  brewing  industry  in  Belgium  followed  more  or  less  the 
traditional path, where market growth went hand in hand with a rising number of 
breweries in production and a falling market concentration. Concentration was, in 
other words, very responsive to market size. In 1907, at the peak of this increase, 3387 
breweries were active in Belgium, together accounting for a production of 16 283 000 
hL.  This  trend  had  started  around  1870  following  a  prior  concentration  phase 
between 1840 and 1870 involving the introduction of steam power in the breweries35.  
 
This traditional pattern of falling concentration in a growing market showed that 
setup costs relative to market size must have been relatively low, making it easy to 
start  a  new  plant,  and  also  that  the  brewing  industry  was  not  yet  a  ‘high-alpha 
industry’.  After  the  widespread  introduction  of  steam  power  the  limits  of  the 
traditional  technology  for  that  time  were  approached  for  many  breweries.  Little 
progress  could  be  made  by  making  large  investments,  contributing  to  falling 
concentration. Transport costs were very high and since beer was a bulk product, 
these  costs  mattered  a  lot.  The  railway  revolution  had  its  consequences  on  beer 
transport  to  a  small extent,  but  mostly horse  and  cart,  were  still relied  upon  for 
transportation. Brewers made tours throughout town on a regular basis, providing 
their customers with beer. This beer was, compared to present-day standards, mostly 
of  a  rather  low  quality  and  could  not  be  kept  for  long,  thus  hampering  further 
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provincie Antwerpen, Antwerpen, 1984, p. 105.   10 
transport or trade over longer distances. Moreover, for most breweries there was the 
additional cost of returning the empty draughts or bottles36. These high transport 
costs  basically  obstructed  market  integration.  This  market  segregation  was 
strengthened  by  the  fact  that  because  of  the  used  technology  each  of  those  local 
brewers had their own kind of beer with a distinctly different taste.  
 
World War I led to a split in this development. Of course war activities disrupted the 
proper functioning of the breweries, especially in the western part of the country, 
close to the frontline. Consumption during wartime was affected as well. Breweries 
lacked workforce because of the war and there were shortages of raw materials37. 
Furthermore,  the  German  occupiers  demanded  on  a  regular  basis  for  the  copper 
brewing kettles which made vital infrastructure disappear for the brewers and led to 
a lot of closures in the sector. 
The effect of the WW I on the active breweries can be spotted immediately. The 
number of breweries in production dropped with 34% from 3214 in 1913 to 2109 in 
1919.  Naturally  beer  consumption  in  these  first  post-war  years  was  considerably 
lower and production in destroyed or idle breweries had to be restarted. But, when 
consumption quickly recovered to almost pre-war levels during the first years of the 
1920s, this evolution was not followed by a similar increase in numbers of breweries. 
Instead their number gradually declined further. Apparently something fundamental 
had changed compared to the pre-war period. 
                                                 
36 HOROWITZ, I.; HOROWITZ, A.R.; ‘Firms in a Declining Market: The Brewing Case’ The Journal 
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 (Source: CBB) 
 
Graph 2 showing 1/N as concentration ratio plotted over time demonstrates clearly 
in  combination  with  Graph  1  that  the  traditional  path  followed  since  1870  of  a 
growing market and falling concentration was turned over. The initial onset for this 
breach with the past can probably be found in the changing pattern of technology, 
which on its turn accounted for a different market structure igniting a new form of 
competition.  
For the roots of these technological developments we should return to the nineteenth 





4. THE ORIGINS OF BOTTOM-FERMENTATION 
 
Originating modern brewing in 1842 in the Czech town Plzen with the introduction 
of bottom-fermented beer types to the town brewery is not a far-fetched claim. Both 
names used to describe this new type of beer refer to this. This beer was often called 
Pils, because of its town of origin, or Lager, due to the German word for the bottom-
fermentation process. The storage period that was necessary to give this type of beer 
a smooth flavour was called ‘Lagern’.   12 
The new process differed greatly with respect to the older techniques, which made 
mostly use of the top-fermentation process. In Belgium there was also a third type, 
spontaneous  fermentation,  having  some  importance.  These  beers  of  spontaneous 
fermentation  were  only  produced  in  the  region  around  Brussels,  due  to  specific 
conditions  for  the  micro-organisms  in  that  area.  They  only  constituted  a  small 
percentage of the market in Belgium. 
 
The main distinction between the top- and bottom-fermentation types arises from the 
use of a different kind of yeast, whereas by spontaneous fermentation no yeast is 
added, depending solely on micro-organisms in the air carrying wild yeasts.  
Other differences in production techniques stem mostly from this distinction. Top-
fermenting yeast was the traditional kind38, used since ancient times for brewing and 
baking. The utilisation of Lager yeast39 by brewers goes way back as well, until 1400, 
but was restricted to Bavaria in Germany. Fermentation in cold weather and storage 
in  cool  Alpine  caves  had  led  to  a  natural  selection  of  a  special  type  of  yeast, 
particularly suited for these conditions. 
Better  understanding  of  the  fermentation  process  due  to  scientific  research  in 
laboratories led the Czech brewers of the Plzen brewery to adopt the Bavarian-style 
Lager yeasts in the first half of the nineteenth century. The combination of this new 
type of fermentation, local materials and a new industrialised method produced a 
new type of beer, Pilsen, which became immediately extremely popular.  
This different type of yeast made a new kind of technique possible and thus required 
a whole new set of equipment. 
 
During the brewing process, the traditional Top-fermenting yeast was added in the 
fermentation vessels approximately at room temperature, between 15° and 25° C. In 
the beginning of the twentieth century most of the top-fermenting brewers made this 
process happen in oak draughts, which were later on used for transport40. When 
fermentation was finished, the yeast settled as foam on the surface, where it was 
skimmed  off  by  the  brewer.  Hence  they  are  referred  to  as  top-fermenting  beers. 
Because of the rather high temperature, fermentation develops fast. Fermentation 
and the following maturation phase take only a couple of weeks. When this process 
was completed, the resulting beer was ready for consumption. 
Bottom-fermenting yeast ferments at a much lower temperature, between 6° to 9° C, 
meaning that most of the time the process needed artificial chilling to be carried out 
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properly.  At  first  this  was  done  with  natural  ice.  This  was  very  complicated,  in 
particular  in  countries  with  mild  winters,  where  ice  had  to  be  shipped  to  from 
mountain  regions  or  Scandinavia.  The  breakthrough  of  mechanical  coolers  came 
around 1880 when Carl Linde made a device based on ammonia with cooling pipes 
for large spaces41.  
Fermentation  took  place  in  large  tubs  and  could  take  up  to  twenty  days.  When 
finished, the yeast collected at the bottom of the tub, giving way to the term bottom-
fermentation.  After  this  process  the  resulting  liquid  was  not  ready  yet  for 
consumption. It needed a storing period of at least thirty days or more. This storage 
had  to  be  withdrawn  from  the  variations  of  outdoor  climate  and  required 
temperatures close to 0° C. Thus, costly additional refrigeration in the large storage 
rooms  was  necessary.  This  long  storage  period,  which  could  take  months42,  was 
needed to give the beer a smoother flavour by dissolving the sulfur created during 
the fermentation process.  
 
Various countries adopted this new technology on a different time and on a different 
scale. Naturally Bohemia was the first region to switch to this new kind of beer. 
Being a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the nineteenth century, the rest of 
that country adopted the new process quickly. In Bavaria in Southern Germany this 
approach  was  more  or  less  equal  to  the  traditional  brewing  style,  so  little 
adjustments had to be made to produce the new type of beer. The eastern part of 
France and the Netherlands were among the early adopters as well43.  Belgium was 
relatively late in its transformation towards the new technological developments. It 
took until after 1880 for some of the large Belgian breweries to switch a considerable 
part  of  their  production  to  bottom-fermentation.  The  biggest  laggard  in  this 
transformation  was  probably  the  United  Kingdom.  The  United  Kingdom  was 
traditionally dominated by its top-fermenting, mostly Ale and Bitter, breweries. It 
was not until the 1970s that the bottom-fermentation segment started to constitute a 
reasonable share of sales44. 
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5. THE BREAKTHROUGH OF BOTTOM-FERMENTATION IN BELGIUM 
 
So, already before WW I some of the large Belgian breweries had made a switch to 
bottom-fermentation,  be  it  only  as  a  limited  extension  to  their  standard  product 
range. The big Brussels-based brewery Wielemans-Ceuppens was probably the first to 
make the changeover in 1884. Other large brewers such as La Vignette and Artois in 
1892 followed their lead and started producing bottom-fermenting beer as variants of 
the Pilsen type45. The brewery Haecht was the first to go completely over to bottom-
fermentation production in 1902, at the same time becoming the best equipped and 
most  modern  Belgian  brewery.  Still  it  took  until  the  interwar  years  for  the  real 
breakthrough of lager type beers on the Belgian market. A shift in the preferences of 
the  consumers  took  place  in  the  interwar  years.  Maybe  the  German  occupation, 
where Lager beer had been drunk for long time, could have had some influence on 
public taste. In any case, growing welfare and increased buying power in the course 
of the 1920s made people getting used to this new taste of lager beers, which were 
more  expensive  and,  up  until  then,  seen  as  a  more  elitist  upper-class  beer46. 
Furthermore, the price difference between top- and bottom-fermenting beers tended 
to diminish due to technological developments in the process of the latter. The effects 
of the war had their importance as well. As said before, a lot of breweries were 
destroyed  during  WW  I  or  had  lost  some  of  their  equipment  to  the  German 
occupiers. Many brewers received retribution payments as a compensation for their 
lost copper kettles or destroyed breweries. This suddenly enabled them to recuperate 
some of the costs that were previously thought of as sunk. Lots of those brewers 
decided to exit the industry and invest the money in other businesses. But those who 
remained in business could more easily invest in a whole new set of equipment, 
often  choosing  for  the  new  bottom-fermenting  technology.  Because  of  this,  the 
Belgian consumer became ever more accustomed to this new taste, again putting 
pressure on other breweries to make the switch as well.  
 
After all, there were also quite some advantages attached for the consumer to the 
Lager type of beer. 
The first plus of the Pilsen-type was the aforementioned longer shelf life of this beer. 
The imperfect production process of the top-fermenting beers created beers that were 
of a changeable quality. The higher fermentation temperature for example, made the 
beer easy susceptible to contamination with micro-organisms or wild yeasts during 
fermentation. The more complicated production process of bottom-fermenting beer 
                                                 
45 VAN UYTVEN, R., ‘Brouwers en drinkers’ in: VAN ERMEN, E. (ed.), Waar is de tijd? 2000 jaar 
Leuven en Oost-Brabant., Zwolle, 2000, p. 45. 
46 HET BROUWERSBLAD, 33 (1925), p. 314.   15 
at  lower  temperatures  and  thorough  filtering  of  the  liquid  during  the  lagering 
process made this type more resistant to decay and enabled brewers to transport this 
type over longer distances. 
 
Secondly, due to the same differences in production process, top-fermenting beers 
had a large variance in taste. Each new brew could be different from the last one, and 
each brewery definitely had its own taste of beer, making this beer actually a very 
differentiated product. The best of these beers could have a very sophisticated taste 
and could easily be improved by adding different kinds of herbs. This could be an 
advantage  for  the  top-fermenting  type,  if  a  steady  quality  could  be  guaranteed. 
Unfortunately  this  was  not  the  case.  Variance  in  taste  was  combined  with  high 
variability in quality of taste. Bottom-fermenting beer in contrast showed a stable, 
decent quality, delivering a homogenous product so that the customer knew what to 
expect47.  Or,  as  Albert  Mertens,  a  professor  from  the  brewing  school  of  Louvain 
explained in 1927: “Top-fermenting beer, when it is well ripe is by no means inferior to 
bottom-fermenting beer; all lovers of good beer agree on this; but still top-fermenting beers 
withdraw in favour to bottom-fermenting beers in almost the whole of the country. Why? 
Because bottom-fermenting beers are a more regular product and accordingly more sellable. 
When a customer asks a Lager, either in Namur, or in Bruges, either in March or September; 
he knows what he is going to get48.” 
 
Finally, poor filtering during the production process of top-fermenting beers made 
this kind of brew quiet turbid and mat looking, filled with floating particles of the 
malt. Since as from the nineteenth century beer was drunk from transparent glasses, 
this was not an appetising view. The Pilsen-process on the other hand produced a 
clear and translucent liquid with a radiant yellow shine, accompanied by a lavish 
foam collar49, which was much more appreciated by consumers50. The importance of 
this trait of the bottom-fermenting type should not be underestimated and can be 
shown by looking at the first brand names breweries gave to their Pilsen type beer in 
the Interwar Years, seeing this characteristic as one of the most important appealing 
to the customer. The brewery Alken called its Pilsen-beer Cristal after the crystal-clear 
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colour of their brew, the breweries Artois and Caulier called their beer Stella and Perle 
28 referring respectively to clear starlight and the shine of a pearl. 
These attributes of the bottom-fermenting beer positioned this type of beer, despite 
its relatively high cost, at the high-end of the product range. Consumers who were 
able to afford it preferred the Pilsen-type to the older top-fermenting beer that was 
increasingly seen as a product for the low-class worker. 
 
 
6. TOP-FERMENTATION VERSUS BOTTOM-FERMENTATION IN BELGIUM 
 
But this transition period wasn’t a straight sailing at all. The older top-fermenting 
breweries,  which  were  still  a  large  majority  in  Belgium  throughout  the  Interwar 
Years, felt they could not compete with the bottom-fermenting breweries. So they 
reacted strongly on the rise of their new large-scale competitors, whose methods they 
saw as treason to their ancient tradition and craft. They reckoned that their beers, if 
brewed in a proper fashion, were still superior to the bottom-fermenting type. A kind 
of beer-war developed between top-fermentation-only breweries and brewers who 
also made bottom-fermenting beers. 
 
This duality was also found in the professional organisation of the Belgian brewers, 
the General Federation of Belgian Brewers. Two groups were formed in the brewing 
sector. This formed a rift in the brewing circles which were previously characterised 
by a rather large solidarity among their members.  
After WW I, the modern, mainly bottom-fermenting breweries were united in the 
Consortium of Belgian Brewers. This organisation was a solid block and even adopted 
price restrictions for some time at these first post-war years to lessen competition 
among the bottom-fermenting breweries. In 1925 this group consisted of 24 large 
breweries, making great profits51. 
In reaction to the formation of this Consortium and to the threat that was posed to 
them  by  the  rise  of  the  bottom-fermenting  beers,  the  smaller  brewers  organised 
themselves as well in the 1920s. Their movement, the Consortium of Belgian brewers of 
top-fermentation  was  carried  mainly  by  some  of  the  smaller  Antwerp  based  top-
fermenting brewers, but assembled from time to time large delegations of Belgian 
top-fermenting brewers throughout the whole country52. Their demands were mostly 
situated in the legal area, basically asking for governmental protection through the 
rewriting  of  old  laws  or  the  enactment  of  new  ones.  In  their  opinion  they  were 
prejudiced by the current system in comparison with the powerful lobby of the big 
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bottom-fermenting  brewers.  They  also  helped  each  other  by  sharing  ideas  on 
technological and technical developments in the top-fermenting brewery.  
Competition with the better liked Lager beers, forced them to try new techniques or 
to use new additives on their beers to improve the taste and general quality of their 
product. 
 
An important case in that matter, where the Consortium of top-fermenting brewers 
played a major part, was the use of Saccharin in the brewing process. Saccharin was 
the first artificial sweetener, invented at the end of the nineteenth century, but it only 
came into fashion after sugar shortages in WW I. 
Because of the breakthrough of Lager beer in the brewing industry, a clear en sweet 
drink was appreciated by the consumers after WW I where before dark and winy 
types  were  preferred.  In  winter  top-fermenting  brewers  could  diminish  their 
drawback in these by adding sugar to the liquid to sweeten the beer. In summer this 
was rendered impossible by the heat causing refermentation in the beer. So Saccharin 
was  used  instead.  But  researchers  in  the  brewing  schools  as  well  as  scientists  in 
general quickly deemed Saccharin unfit for consumption due to the possibility of 
endangering human health53. A federation was even formed against the free use of 
Saccharin  in  food  products.  Strengthened  by  this,  Belgian  bottom-fermenting 
brewers started lobbying to prohibit the use of Saccharin. The Belgian government 
had ears for them and banned Saccharin from the brewing industry in 192354. This 
led to a lot of commotion among the smaller brewers and the Consortium of Belgian 
brewers  of  top-fermentation  reacted  fiercely  to  this  law.  According  to  them, 
Saccharin was harmless and the prohibition was only meant harm them. They saw 
this prohibition as a major cause of the crisis of the top-fermenting breweries stating 
that  700  small  breweries  had  to  close  because  this  law55.  This  was  manifestly 
exaggerated, but  it  was  true  this  law  meant  a drag  on  the  already  troubled top-
fermenting  breweries.  Finally in  1928  a bill was  designed  to  change  the law  and 
make an exception to breweries, which eventually passed. This could have eased the 
problems of the small top-fermenting breweries somewhat, but it is clear the crisis 
remained. 
Another juridical battle that was fought by the top-fermenting brewers and their 
Consortium was about the imposition of a progressive tax law56. With this law they 
wanted the government to protect their smaller breweries by levying a relatively 
                                                 
53 MERTENS, A., ‘Où en sommes nous? L’évolution économique et technique de la brasserie belge’ 
Bulletin  trimestriel  de  l’Association  des  anciens  élèves  de  l’Ecole  supérieure  de  brasserie  de  l’ 
université de Louvain, 26-3 (1926), p.159. 
54 HET BROUWERSBLAD, 36 (1928), p. 334. 
55 HET BROUWERSBLAD, 36 (1928), p. 334 
56 HET BROUWERSBLAD, 35 (1927), p. 1170.   18 
higher  tariff  on  larger  production  units.  This  way  the  smaller  top-fermenting 
breweries enjoyed a tax advantage against their larger counterparts. This law did not 
change the tide either for the smaller breweries but it would have its impact on the 
way the increase in scale in the brewing industry occurred.  
 
The law or governmental protection could not save the small breweries; hence other, 
technological paths were followed as well to improve the quality and the stability of 
top-fermentation beer. They were mostly inspired by the technical developments in 
the bottom-fermentation sector. Some concerned the use of better primary materials 
or the employment of scientifically improved measuring instruments57.  
But no doubt the most significant evolution was the introduction of artificial chilling 
in the top-fermenting brewery, also copying bottom-fermentation techniques58. This 
way, top-fermenting brewers could make beer of a more stable quality, especially in 
summer, which was very difficult before. There were a few companies that delivered 
cooling  installations  designed  for  the  Belgian  top-fermentation  breweries,  but  the 
most important was the firm Kendall59. This firm, based in Lille, in Northern France 
had an ingenious system to apply the cooling method to top-fermentation, which it 
tried to sell by means of big advertising campaigns in the professional magazines. In 
these  campaigns  they  clearly  articulated  the  threat  that  faced  the  top-fermenting 
brewers, and of course recommended their system as the solution. But besides their 
system that ameliorated the quality and stability of the top-fermentation beer, they 
also dispensed advice on how to run a brewing facility independently and efficiently 
in  the  modern  society.  They  even  offered  their  experience  on  advertising  and 
commercial  activities  to  help  the  smaller  breweries  to  establish  real  brands  to 
accompany their new special beer and to compete with the large bottom-fermenting 
breweries60. In this way the firm portrayed itself as the big defender of the traditional 
top-fermenting breweries while at the same time putting its finger on the sore spot of 
those smaller brewers. 
But despite its ingenious system and its extensive promotion campaigns, Kendall 
was not as successful as it had hoped. This was probably because of the large fixed 
costs that were brought about for the smaller breweries by the investment in their 
machines. These costs were too high for the small, top-fermenting breweries and 
were the main reason in the first place why they continued to use top-fermentation. 
Only the larger top-fermenting breweries could afford this expensive machinery. So 
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this  development  actually  contributed  to  the  broader  evolution  to  large-scale 
breweries  producing  beers  that  were  of  a  more  stable  quality  but  also  more 
homogeneous and exchangeable.   
 
Hence, the crisis for the smaller top-fermenting breweries remained throughout the 
Interwar  Years,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  sector  as  a  whole  performed 
soundly and weathered the crisis of the 1930s remarkably well61. 
Therefore to contemporary authors the reasons for the concentration in the brewing 
sector  and  the  decline  of  the  smaller  breweries  were  clear.  The  small  breweries 
disappeared  or  diminished  in  importance  while  the  large  ones  increased  and 
expanded  their  activities  because  the  industry  evolved  at  a  rapid  pace  towards 
industrial  production  in  the  shape  of  bottom-fermentation62.  Quickly  increasing 
concentration resulted this way. 
 
 
7. SUTTON AND CONCENTRATION IN THE BELGIAN BREWING SECTOR IN 
THE INTERWAR YEARS 
 
The  traditional  economic  literature  gives  a  rather  similar  explanation  for  the 
concentration in the brewing sector that took place in most developed countries at 
different  times  and  pace  in  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century63.  Most  authors 
emphasize the importance of steadily rising fixed costs in the production process. To 
recover these costs they have to be split among a higher production. This means that 
average costs will fall for a long time, when production rises, leading to considerable 
economies of scale. This leads to an upward trending of the minimum efficient scale of 
production  (M.E.S.).  When  this  happens  in  a  market  where  demand  is  stable  or 
declining the natural outcome is increasing concentration. Due to the lower average 
costs, bigger companies could set lower prices than smaller companies. To compete 
those  smaller  firms  have  to  invest  in  large-scale  production.  The  recuperation  of 
those larger investment costs has to come through the obtainment of a bigger market 
share. When smaller firms are unable to make these large investments or won’t get a 
larger market share after the investment, they exit the industry, thus leaving their 
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former  share  to  one  of  the  bigger  companies.  This  leads  in  a  competitive 
environment to more concentration.  
 
If one translates this theory to the Belgian brewing sector in the Interwar Years many 
parallels can be drawn. Due to the switch to bottom-fermentation and the following 
adoption  of  a  new  technology,  fixed  costs  rose  a  lot.  The  Lager  process  needed 
artificial cooling not only during fermentation, but also throughout a long storage 
period,  which  was  very  expensive.  Because  of  this  long  storage  period  a  lot  of 
storeroom was necessary. Bottom-fermentation took longer, so to maintain the same 
yearly production volume larger tubs were needed. Top-fermenting breweries that 
tried  to  compete  had  to  raise  their  fixed  costs  as  well.  They  also  needed  new 
equipment  such  as  cooling  systems  to  improve  the  quality  of  their  beers.  All 
breweries had to invest in new systems and material for transportation. Moreover 
they required more power machinery and better laboratory techniques to control the 
brewing process. Due to growing home consumption in the Interwar Years many 
breweries were compelled to invest in bottleries. Beer for home consumption was 
mostly sold in bottles whereas for bars and pubs delivery depended on draughts. 
According to the theory, this rise in fixed costs caused by the transition to industrial 
bottom-fermentation brewing would then have forced smaller breweries to exit and 
made larger breweries capture a bigger market share. 
Some other additional sources for the concentration were cited as well. Advertising 
was  seen  as  an  exogenous  cost  with  increasing  returns  to  scale,  contributing  to 
increasing  concentration64.  For  the  Belgian  brewing  sector  in  particular  growing 
advertising  costs  and  image-competition  were  seen  as  factors  adding  to  growing 
concentration and at the same time giving the deathblow to most top-fermenting 
breweries65. 
 
These  theories  contain  without  any  doubt  a  lot  of  truth.  But  they  don’t  offer  a 
complete explanation. The rise in fixed costs and the subsequent shift in the M.E.S. 
certainly led to important economies of scale in production. But this rise in setup 
costs  cannot  account  for  all  of  the  increase  in  concentration.  Transport  costs 
remaining  high  in  absolute  terms  and  the  progressive  tax  system  putting  large 
production plants at a disadvantage, impeded the economies of scale to take full 
effect.  Because  of  this,  when  mergers  or  acquisitions  took  place  in  the  brewing 
industry in the Interwar Years or the decennia after WWII often different production 
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plants were kept, implying that economies of scale in production were not always 
the deciding factor for this move. 
There are indeed also increasing returns to scale to advertising in the beer market, 
but the effects of advertising can go beyond the simple increasing returns to scale if 
we involve strategic behaviour of firms into the analysis. 
John Sutton was the first who really anchored the previous explanations about the 
causes of concentration in one structure and extended the analysis when necessary. 
To  substantiate his  theory  on  sunk  costs  and market  structure  Sutton  involved a 
study on the history of the American brewing industry in his work as an example of 
a case where endogenous and exogenous costs interacted66.  
 
Since the ending of the Prohibition the American brewing industry also knew several 
phases of concentration, essentially evolving to a very concentrated structure. When 
in  1933  Prohibition  finally  was  suspended  many  of  the  breweries  that  operated 
before in a fragmented structure67 never reopened. In the mean time, technological 
developments  in  the  brewing  industry  had  the  effect  of  raising  setup  costs.  This 
alone could make concentration trend modestly higher. But this exogenous shock 
was  not  fully  independent  of  other  endogenously  established  factors.  These 
exogenous  changes  stimulated,  by  raising  the  level  of  setup  costs,  concomitant 
increases  in  the  endogenously  chosen  advertising  outlays  of  the  breweries.  This 
accentuated and strengthened the tendency towards higher concentration. They both 
play a part in the same unified mechanism68 where an increase in setup costs leads to 
an increase in advertising intensity. The lower bound to equilibrium concentration, 
or the level where concentration will never sink beneath, varies with the amount of 
setup costs.  
When  setup  costs  became  high  they  favoured  large-scale  production.  As  a  result 
concentration increased. But at the same time, because of this tendency to large-scale 
production and of some societal changes, capturing rival’s market shares through 
advertising became more profitable for the American breweries. The brewing sector 
essentially  developed  into  a  high-alpha  industry.  There  were  successive  phases 
where firms engaged in costly forms of advertising escalation. Breweries tried to 
establish or strengthen their brands with the purpose of raising the perceived quality 
of their beers and thus increasing their market share at the expense of their rivals.  
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So in the American experience the initial onset of concentration could be traced to an 
increase in setup costs boosting economies of scale but a central role in the change of 
market structure was played by this escalation in advertising. 
Considering the fact that a rise in setup costs and the importance of advertising were 
already cited by authors as a cause of concentration in the Belgian brewing industry, 
it will be interesting to examine whether the picture Sutton painted of the American 
brewing industry also holds for the Belgian sector. 
To qualify for this story, the Belgian brewing industry should have evolved to a 
high- alpha industry.  
 
First of all in Belgium during the first decennia of the twentieth century there was 
also  a  shock  of  exogenous  sunk  costs  in  the  fashion  of  a  transition  to  bottom-
fermentation, as has been extensively argued in the previous sections of the paper. 
The beginning of this effect can be spotted by the short rupture that WWI formed in 
the development of the Belgian brewing industry. Many breweries did not restart 
their businesses at the end of the war, as happened with lots of American breweries 
after the end of the Prohibition. In the United States these rising exogenous costs 
made the escalation of endogenous sunk costs possible. 
As  mentioned  before,  the  value  of  alpha,  or  the  extent  to  which  a  fragmented 
industry  can  be  destabilised  by  a  firm  escalating  its  endogenous  sunk  costs, 
furthermore depends on two factors. 
 
The first is the effectiveness by which the real or perceived quality of a product can 
be raised. In this case it boils down to the characteristics of advertising. When the 
efficiency of advertising increases or the cost of it decreases, this factor will have the 
effect of augmenting alpha. Beer was a typical product where producers were prone 
to invest in loyal customers by means of advertising because of the short shelf-life of 
the product. When sunk costs increased during the Interwar Years this became a 
characteristic of even higher importance. 
In the food industry the big progression of advertising and branded articles during 
the  Interwar  Years  can  be  attributed  to  new  ways  of  communication  between 
producers and consumers. Besides the regular retail outlets, such as pubs and stores 
for  the  beer  market,  other  intermediaries  were  now  more  willing  to  incorporate 
advertising  into  their  normal  practice.  These  growing  media  became  a  powerful 
instrument for advertising campaigns. Ever more magazines and newspapers of all 
kinds started to accept advertising as a way to reduce the price for their customers69. 
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This improved the way to reach potential consumers exponentially. Where before 
customers had to be informed by travelling salesmen or by placards on pubs or in 
the streets, which only reached a small public, now large masses could be contacted 
at once through an advertisement in one of the important magazines or newspapers. 
However, this was a fixed cost, invariable of production volume, thus warranting 
large-scale  production.  This  way  the  effectiveness  of  advertising  increased 
enormously  and  accordingly  the  attractiveness  of  escalation  strategies  grew, 
augmenting alpha. 
 
The second factor determining alpha is linked to the homogeneity of the market. A 
more  homogenous  market  enables  firms  to  easily  capture  market  share  of  their 
rivals. It can be argued that the Belgian beer market became more homogenous in the 
Interwar Years. After large-scale introduction of lager-type beers after WWI their 
share  of  the  market  grew  rapidly.  There  are  no  entirely  reliable  data  about  the 
relative  market  shares  of  top-fermenting  and  bottom-fermenting  beers  but 
contemporary estimates assess the share of lager beers at 15% of the market at the 
end of WWI which rose swiftly to 55% in 1928. Hereafter growth of its share slowed 
down and stabilized until the end of WWII70. Eventually, after WWII a share of 70% 
for  lager  beer  was  reached.  This  share  of  lager  beers  during  the  Interwar  Years 
consisted  mostly  of  some  quite  uniform  and  exchangeable  beers.  The  large 
proportion  of  those  bottom-fermenting  beers  contrasted  strongly  with  the  highly 
segmented market before WWI, dominated by many diverse types of top-fermenting 
beer. Besides, because of the technological developments in reaction to the bottom-
fermentation  beer,  most  top-fermentation  beers  became  more  uniform  and 
homogenous  as  well.  In  this  manner  the  introduction  of  lager  beers  made  an 
important contribution to the homogenisation of the Belgian beer market. 
Another thing impacting the homogeneity of the market is the reduction of transport 
costs in the Interwar Years. The road network was extended and improved to enable 
the use of motorised vehicles. More roads in the rural areas were macadamised71. The 
widespread  use  of  motorised  vehicles  revolutionised  transport,  notably  in  the 
brewing sector, where transport costs had always been an important issue. Transport 
by pick-up trucks or lorries instead of horse and cart became the rule, where before 
WWI this was reserved only for the very largest breweries72. Additionally, the longer 
shelf life of the lager beers and the modernised top-fermentation beers facilitated 
transport over longer distances. Because of this, the Belgian market developed from a 
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highly segmented market into a more unified national market where many breweries 
entered into each others spheres of influence.  
All  of  this  basically  had  the  effect  of  making  the  Belgian  beer  market  more 
homogenous during the Interwar Years. These factors also affected alpha, making 
escalation strategies more profitable. 
 
The  increase  in  effectiveness  of  advertising  and  the  market  becoming  more 
homogenous through the lager beer and the decrease in transport costs augmented 
alpha, turning the Belgian brewing industry into a high-alpha industry. 
The jump of exogenous sunk costs in the shape of the sudden rising M.E.S. due to the 
introduction of bottom-fermentation beer could provide the final incentive spurring 
the  Belgian  breweries  to  a  competitive  escalation  of  sunk  costs.  The  American 
experience supplies an example as to where this escalation can lead to. 
This evolution of the Belgian brewing industry to a high-alpha industry would imply 
a rupture with the traditional pattern, otherwise the stability condition would be 
violated.  This  means  that  one  smart  agent  is  needed  to  fill  the  profitable 
opportunities that the new developments had constituted. In this case, at least one of 
the  Belgian  brewers  should  in  time  see  the  new  advantages  a  big  advertising 
campaign could yield, thus triggering an escalation of endogenous sunk costs.  
 
During  the  Interwar  Years  there  was  indeed  among  brewing  circles  a  growing 
interest  for  the  benefits  that  could  be  realised  through  the  proper  use  of  new 
advertising instruments. Professional magazines encouraged this interest, influenced 
by developments in the neighbouring countries, such as France or the Netherlands, 
where the importance of advertising was recognized before73. Big events were seized 
upon by breweries to promote their beer and brand names were announced in large 
advertisements  in  the  important  newspapers.  Another  reason  why  professional 
organisations  encouraged  the  use  of  advertising  was  because  they  asserted  that 
societal changes favoured a trend towards home consumption instead of drinking 
beer in pubs or bars. Hence breweries had to make sure that consumers took their 
beer  home.  However  this  tendency  should  not  be  exaggerated.  For  example, 
Schroeven (1994) uses estimates about the share of home consumption of Belgian 
beer of 10% in the 1920s and 15% in the 1930s74. 
 
As the theory predicted, eventually one of the Belgian brewers exploited this new 
opportunity. The brewery Caulier was originally one of the second tier breweries but 
                                                 
73 HET BROUWERSBLAD, 34 (1926), p. 652. 
74 SCHROEVEN, C., Consumer expenditure in interwar Belgium 1920-1939: The reconstruction of a 
database., Leuven, 1994, p.93.   25 
evolved in short time to one of the leading firms in the Belgian brewing industry. 
They  were  the  first  to  fully  incorporate  modern  advertising  into  their  business 
strategy around the mid 1920s. Starting as a medium-size brewery, they adopted the 
modern  style  of  advertising  from  the  large  foreign  breweries  and  spent  large 
amounts of money to promote their new Pilsen-beer, branded Perle 28. They mainly 
used  modern witty cartoon-like  advertisements  in  the big  Belgian newspapers  to 
support their new beer. This succeeded wonderfully, and Perle 28 quickly became 
the most popular Belgian beer. This success prompted other large Belgian breweries 
to follow their example. The second largest Belgian brewer, Artois, responded hastily 
in 1926 by introducing its own important brand; Stella. Stella was originally meant as 
a Christmas special, but being a big hit, Artois decided to keep this beer as primary 
brand and backed it by considerable advertising expenses. A bit later, other Belgian 
brewers followed their suit as well, such as the brewery Alken with their brand Cristal 
in 1928 or the biggest Belgian brewer, Wielemans-Ceuppens with Wiel’s. The idea of 
modern  branding  and  advertising  clearly  broke  through  during  the  1920s  in  the 
Belgian brewing industry. Towards the beginning of the 1930s these expenses for 
publicity  became  a  real  burden  for  the  breweries.  The  industry  expenses  for 
advertising rose up to 30.000.000BEF, comparable to all the costs for packaging such 
as bottling or draughts and more than half of all the transport costs75. 
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(Source: Het brouwersblad76) 
 
Table 1: Market shares Belgian breweries 
   1925  1926  1927  1928  1929 
Wielemans-
Ceuppens  4,16%  4,34%  4,08%  4,64%  5,00% 
Artois  3,95%  4,06%  4,27%  4,62%  4,53% 
St-Michel   3,02%  3,40%  3,60%  3,66%  3,92% 
Haecht  2,41%  2,28%  2,59%  2,66%  3,05% 
Ixelles  1,88%  1,88%  1,75%  1,73%  1,90% 
Chevalier Marin  1,46%  1,74%  1,92%  1,94%  2,03% 
Caulier  1,27%  1,54%  2,13%  2,69%  2,85% 
Chasse Royale   1,37%  1,52%  1,65%  1,95%  1,89% 
(Source: Het brouwersblad) 
 
Graphically some of the effects of the escalations can be noted. This graph shows the 
market shares of the major Belgian breweries. The Belgian market was the relevant 
market  for  the  analysis,  with  the  shares  of  import  and  export  being  very  low 
throughout the whole of the interwar years.  Export constituted at most 0.3% of total 
                                                 
76 These data are constructed by means of reports of primary materials for the Excise Authority by the 
main Belgian breweries. These data were for some time publicised by Het Brouwersblad, but their 
publication was quickly halted due to complaints of smaller breweries, who saw those publications as a 
form of free advertisement for the large breweries.   27 
production and import accounted for no more than 1.9% of total consumption during 
those years. These are the maximal numbers for the interwar years which makes it 
safe largely to neglect the influence of foreign countries on Belgian production and 
consumption of beer. The importance of the home market made that Belgian brewers 
did not show much interest for export77. Besides, some of the potentially important 
foreign  markets,  such  as  Germany,  adopted  a  very  protectionist  stance  towards 
foreign beers.  
 
In spite of the limited period for which those market shares could be reconstructed 
we can still notice that the market share of the brewery Caulier was quickly rising 
since the mid 1920s. Its market share nearly doubled in six years time, evolving from 
the tenth largest brewery to the fifth of the country. Most of the other important 
breweries had rising market shares as well. C4, a commonly used measurement of 
concentration in economics, which adds up the market shares of the four largest 
firms in the sector, grew with 20% from 0.139 to 0.164 in these same years. It should 
be noted that these market shares remained rather low in absolute terms because the 
Belgian  beer  market  was  in  a  process  of  evolving  from  an  almost  completely 
fragmented structure and transport costs were still an important issue. Still, in the 
interwar  years  the  number  of  active  breweries  diminished  at  a  rapid  pace.    The 
number declined with 47% between 1919 and 1939 (Graph 1).  
 
The growing importance of the biggest breweries and the continuous decrease of the 
total  number  of  active  breweries  provide  a  clear  picture  of  the  industrial 
concentration that took place in the Belgian brewing sector. Most of the concentration 
arose from internal growth of the larger and medium sized firms. Acquisitions and 
mergers  were  only  a  small  influence  on  concentration.  The  institution  of  an 
important new law in 1927 which facilitated these mergers and acquisitions78 could 
only have had a marginal impact on concentration in the brewing sector since at that 
time only 10 % of the closures in the brewery sector were attributed to these mergers 
and acquisitions79. There were of course a few important mergers as exceptions to the 
rule. Already in 1919 a corporation, N.V. Krüger, was formed between 24 brewers in 
the region of Eeklo, pooling their capital in one new brewery, which enabled them to 
start producing bottom-fermenting beers80. The same happened in Ghent, where 20 
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brewers  united  themselves  in  one  big  brewery,  Belgica.  In  1928  this  firm  merged 
again, this time with the Bruges based brewery, L’Aigle, to become one of the leading 
Belgian breweries81. 
 
But, most of the time smaller breweries that were not competitive anymore retreated 
from business in one way or another. Sutton predicts that often when firms are not 
able to compete in the escalation of sunk costs, they retreat to some kind of low 
advertising niche market, mostly at the bottom-end of the market, such as low cost 
production  for  retail-outlets.  Something  comparable  happened  in  the  Belgian 
brewing sector. Many of the small top-fermenting breweries that didn’t have enough 
resources  to  launch  their  own  lager  brand  sought  different  ways  to  keep  their 
customers.  The  big  breweries  capitalised  on  this  trend  by  what  the  firm  Kendall 
called a ‘Sirene’s call’ in their advertisements82. They offered their big lager brands to 
the smaller breweries at a discount so that they were able to sell these brands to their 
clients. Many smaller breweries made use of this offer and sold those premium lager-
beers next to their own top-fermenting beers. But breweries applying this strategy 
soon faced another problem. Their clients demanded ever more of the lager-brands 
and less of their own top-fermentation beers. In this manner the importance of their 
own  production  decreased  continuously.  These  firms  gradually  became  more 
dependant on selling the brands of the bigger breweries and evolved in time almost 
completely  to  retail  outlets  for  the  brands  of  the  bigger  breweries,  serving  as 
beverage wholesale stores. In this way they remained more or less in the sector and 
their exit out of the real production of beer went in a more natural way. 
 
Only  the  biggest  breweries  could  afford  this  escalation  of  advertising  outlays. 
Smaller and medium-size breweries saw their shares decline in favour of those big 
breweries and they reverted to a traditional means of defending their territory. This 
mechanism concerned an elaborate sales strategy, by which on different ways outlets 
for their production could be secured. 
There were three related ways to conduct this strategy83. In the fist way, a brewery 
could simply buy or establish its own chain of bars and pubs which gave the brewer 
a fixed outlet for his production. To the disadvantage of this strategy can be said that 
it involved high opportunity costs. The strategy absorbed a lot of capital which the 
brewery could not invest in other things. It was a very expensive way of securing 
sales. 
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A second form of tying the customers consisted of granting long-term credit to pubs. 
Because of the good conditions that were offered the client would be inclined to stay 
with his purveyor. This system was cheaper then owning your own outlets but it was 
also less certain. 
The third system holds the middle position between the former ways. The brewery 
engaged in a contract, a so called pub contract, with the pubs which committed them 
to  obtain  their  beers  only  by  this  brewery  in  return  for  credit  or  other  kinds  of 
economic or financial benefits. This ensured an outlet to the production while at the 
same  time  hampering  competitors  by  prohibiting  the  pub  to  offer  competing 
products of other breweries.  
 
This system of tying sales outlets was long embedded in the beer market, because of 
the peculiar attributes of the product. The short shelf-life of top-fermentation beer 
forced these brewers to look for safe and quick outlets for their production. Securing 
their  outlets  became  ever  more  important  when  the  market  shares  of  these  top-
fermentation brewers came under pressure due to the successes of the big breweries 
in marketing their new lager beers. These different ways of tying outlets became the 
prime weapon of most medium-sized breweries in their struggle to keep their market 
share.  
But  this  strategy  could  yield  considerable  advantages  for  bottom-fermentation 
breweries as well. Although longer then top-fermentation beers, the shelf-life of their 
products was not unlimited either. When their product was kept in tanks its shelf-life 
went from two up until six months. But when the beer was bottled or put in draughts 
it lasted only three or four weeks84. And, because of the economies of scale it was 
very advantageous to use the whole capacity of the installations, for which an outlet 
had to be ensured. Moreover to make sure not to get behind in the race against the 
smaller  top-fermenting  breweries,  lager  breweries  also  had  to  participate  in  the 
scramble for outlets.  
In this manner, the strategy of tying distribution networks was self-reinforcing. In 
the beginning of the 1930s this scramble intensified85. Started as a defence mechanism 
against the larger breweries, this strategy quickly became an instrument in hands of 
the big breweries, and was amplified by the effects of the economic crisis. This crisis 
eventually had some effects on consumption. The declining consumption made the 
tying  of  outlets  for  production  even  more  important  because  or  the  threat  of 
underutilisation of capacity.  
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The fixing of the distribution networks had indeed the effect the smaller breweries 
had  hoped. Market  shares  were basically frozen  by  the  possession  of production 
outlets. This muted further escalation of endogenous sunk costs through advertising 
expenditures.  
 
But soon these tying agreements became a serious financial burden on the breweries 
as well86. Owning pubs or granting credit or other facilities to production outlets was 
very expensive and demanded a lot of the company’s capital. This entailed a lot of 
problems, especially for the smaller breweries. Capital that was fixed in distribution 
could not be used to improve the equipment of the breweries and the quality of their 
products.  Besides,  this  scramble  demanded  more  and  more  capital  of  the  small 
breweries which they could not produce. They were unable to compete with the 
bigger  breweries  in  offering  conditions  to  the  pubs,  or  buying  them.  This  forced 
some  of  the  smaller  businesses  to  exit  the  industry,  and  thus  even  more 
concentration ensued. The primary way to gain market share on competitors was by 
in  one  way  or  another,  taking  over  their  distribution  networks.  To  achieve  this, 
mergers  and  acquisitions  became  gradually  more  important.  After  WWII  this 
strategy soared. Especially in the 1960s acquisitions were a major issue in the Belgian 
beer industry. The brewery Artois was the principal actor in this process, becoming 
by far the largest Belgian brewery through these takeovers.  
 
This process differed substantially from what happened in the United States. There, 
the escalation of sunk costs was not muted to a large extent by tying production 
outlets to the breweries. This was probably because in the United States there was no 
tradition of and some legal obstructions after the ending of Prohibition against tying 
distribution  networks  in  the  beer  market87.  Furthermore,  the  share  of  home 
consumption in total beer consumption was considerably higher there.  
There are some parallels with the situation of the beer market in the United Kingdom 
as Sutton describes it88. There the tying system was probably even more elaborated 
than in Belgium. The scramble for outlets had already started in the last decade of 
the nineteenth century, after which a period a relative stability followed. Typical of 
the English market was the long domination of the improved top-fermenting ale style 
of beers. The rise of lager beers, well after WWII, was characterised by an increase in 
advertising outlays, in particular in the lager segment.  
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For a long time the British beer industry remained quite fragmented89. Industrial 
dynamics were more constrained than in the Belgian case. First of all the number of 
pubs and bars was limited by the government by means of permit restrictions, a 
system which was not present in Belgium. This freezes the structure of the industry 
once  the  outlets  are  divided  among  the  breweries,  unless  important  mergers  or 
takeovers take place. But the British authorities had a more hostile view towards 
mergers  than  the  Belgian  government.  Because of  this  the  tying  of  outlets in  the 
United Kingdom had the effect of preserving fragmentation instead of contributing 
to concentration. 
 
The situation as described in Belgium held the first decennia after WWII. The system 
of tying outlets to breweries remained roughly the same throughout the 1950s and 
1960s.  In  contrast  to  some  other  countries,  no  restrictions  were  imposed  on  the 
practice of buying pubs or granting credit by breweries. This preserved the rivalry 
between  the  important  breweries  and  led  to  the  establishment  of  lots  of  inapt 
merchants.  In  1961  80%  of  the  80000  pubs  or  bars  were  tied  by  means  of  some 
delivery  contract  to  a  brewery90.  This  situation  ignited,  certainly  in  the  1960s  an 
important  merger  wave  since  growth  was  most  easily  realised  by  taking  over  a 
rival’s distribution network. At the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s this situation 
changed. Belgian brewers were more and more engaged in the internationalisation of 
the beer market. New foreign markets opened and in that frame it made little sense 
for a brewery to fix most of its capital in tying a regional distribution network. Ties 
with retail outlets did not disappear but they changed from character and loosened 
somewhat, which also lowered the costs for most breweries. This was combined with 
new developments in mass-communication, such as the breakthrough of television. 
As predicted by Sutton’s theory, this eventually led to a new phase of escalation of 





The  Belgian  brewing  industry  struggled  in  the  interwar  years  with  an  industrial 
structure  inherited  from  the  nineteenth  century  which  was  not  fit  for  the  new 
technological  and  commercial  developments.  This  resulted  in  a  long  phase  of 
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continuous concentration starting at the end of WW I. One of the key catalysts for 
industrial  change  in  the  beer  industry  everywhere,  was  the  introduction  of  the 
bottom-fermentation  process  in  brewing.  This  process  originated  in  Plzen  in  the 
middle of nineteenth century and stems from the use of a different kind of yeast. It 
required  a  new,  more  expensive  and  more  complicated  way  of  brewing.  This 
transformed brewing from an artisanal to an industrial process. This new lager beer 
had a longer shelf-life, was more homogenous in taste and was a better looking, clear 
brew. Because of those qualities, it became immediately a very popular beer, and 
with some delay, it was adopted in the whole developed world. In Belgium this shift 
happened relatively late. Although the first lager beers were produced in Belgium in 
the last decennia of the nineteenth century, it took until the interwar years to see a 
significant change in the preferences of the consumers and the domestic production. 
When that finally happened it led to a structural revolution in the Belgian brewing 
industry. The Belgian beer market was up until then dominated by a large variance 
of  traditional  top-fermentation  beers.  But  the  share  of  lager  beers  increased 
dramatically in the interwar years. This started a rivalry between the big bottom-
fermenting  breweries  and  the  mostly  smaller, top-fermenting  breweries.  The  top-
fermenting  breweries  were  at  a  disadvantage  and  when  legal  or  governmental 
protection  didn’t  sort  the  proper  effect,  they  were  prompted  to  make  important 
technological changes as well, making their production process also more capital 
intensive. 
 
In  this  manner  the  switch  to  bottom-fermentation  gave  a  first  impetus  to 
concentration in the Belgian brewing industry. Rising setup costs and economies of 
scale  were  a  cause  of  concentration.  But  this  was  not  the  sole  explanation  for 
concentration. 
Sutton sees the brewing industry as an example of a high-alpha industry where an 
increase in exogenous sunk costs can be the trigger to an escalation of endogenous 
sunk costs, resulting in concentration. The rise in exogenous sunk costs by the shift to 
bottom-fermentation, or the improvements made in top-fermentation in reaction to 
this shift, could be the trigger for escalation of endogenous sunk costs in Belgium.  
But for this picture to hold it is necessary to see first if the Belgian brewing industry 
could be considered as a high-alpha industry during the interwar years.  
New  ways  of  communication  between  producers  and  consumers  in  the  interwar 
years  increased  the  effectiveness  of  advertising  considerably.  More  and  more 
magazines  and  newspapers  started  to  accept  advertisements  as  a  new  source  of 
income. Quickly many companies in Belgium exploited this opportunity. 
The homogeneity of the market increased as well. The main factors contributing to 
this  were  the  rapid  spread  of  the  more  homogenous  lager  beers,  the  decreasing   33 
variability of the top-fermenting beers, which made beer a less differentiated product 
and the reduction of transport costs. 
 
These evolutions had the effect of transforming the Belgian brewing industry into a 
high-alpha  industry.  As  predicted  by  the  theory  it  became  profitable  for  some 
companies to break the existing configuration in the industry by adopting a strategy 
of escalating endogenous sunk costs. The brewery Caulier was the first to start this 
escalation  with  big  advertising  campaigns  to  promote  their  brand,  rising  quickly 
from a medium sized brewer to one of the leading breweries of the country. Soon its 
lead was followed by most of the other important Belgian breweries, which all came 
with  their  first  real  beer  brands,  backed  by  considerable  amounts  of  advertising. 
Smaller  firms  could not  make  those  investments  and  had  to exit  the industry  or 
became beverage wholesale stores for the products of the bigger breweries. 
But, as Sutton already acknowledged the situation can be complicated thoroughly by 
historical and institutional factors, which also have to be taken into account. The 
eventual outcome will be strongly affected by those factors. 
 
These other aspects were also important to explain the industrial dynamics in the 
Belgian  brewing  industry.  The  practice  of  tying  retail  outlets  to  breweries  was  a 
longstanding tradition in the Belgian beer market. At first these techniques consisted 
mostly of breweries buying their own chain of pubs or granting long-term credits, 
but in the interwar years pub contracts were increasingly used. These agreements 
were intensified in the interwar years mostly as a defence mechanism against the 
actions  of  the  big  lager-brewing  companies.  They  were  successful  in  muting  the 
escalation  of  sunk  costs  of  the  big  breweries  by  diminishing  the  effectiveness  of 
advertising.  But  because  of  the  high  financial  requirements,  this  strategy  soon 
became a burden for the smaller breweries as well, and contributed at its turn to 
more  concentration.  To  further  accentuate  the  importance  of  institutions  and 
historical events, we can mention the British case, where the same strategy of tying 
outlets had the opposite effect of keeping the industry fragmented. 
 
So  Sutton’s  theory  is  certainly  an  interesting  tool  for  historical  analysis  and  its 
framework can provide a partial explanation for the concentration in the Belgian 
brewing industry. As predicted in the theory, at some points of the industry history 
phases of escalation of sunk costs take place in the brewing industry. Parts of the 
interwar years, and later on the period starting at the 1970s are an example of this. 
But, to give a specific explanation for industrial and geographical unique cases many 
historical and institutional should be embedded into the theoretical framework. This 
is in no way a refutation of the theory as it did not claim to provide more than a   34 
underlying pattern that is subject to other determinants effecting eventual outcome. 
It  is  instead  an  example  of  how  economics  and  history  interact,  with  economics 
supplying  the  theoretical  structure  while  history  furnishes  the  facts  to  make  the 
theory suitable for a complicated reality. 
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